U.S.-Japan Alliance

Japan’s new prime minister has long called for more reciprocity in the alliance, including revisions in the Status of Forces Agreement and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The election of late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s long-time rival marks the end of an era in the LDP.

Given South Korea’s heavy reliance on the U.S. military presence for its own security, the reconstitution of USFJ may necessitate a reassessment of Seoul’s strategic posture and defense planning.

Japan will need another international statesman as prime minister. The jury is out as to whether Kishida’s successor, whomever that may be, will meet this high bar. 

As the alliance marks “one of the strongest improvements in 70 years,” there are concerns that this will position Japan as the front line in U.S. strategy to deter China.

While much of the recent analytical focus has been on its role in a crisis, disinformation can have pernicious, real-world effects in peacetime. 

Unless corrective measures are made, and quickly, the anti-U.S. military base sentiment and movement in Okinawa will grow, damaging Japan-U.S. cooperation at a crucial time.

Insights from Naoko Aoki.

New security and military arrangements will have knock-on effects for both Japan and South Korea, their respective U.S. forces, and the regional security architecture.

During his state visit, Kishida was unusually blunt about the dangers current trends in U.S. politics pose to the alliance.

The integration of command-and-control authorities of Japanese and U.S. forces in an emergency remains a critical issue, especially on the U.S. side.